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744 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol 13
these earlier decisions, the court found that there was no showing
of bad faith intent. 143
In comparing the federal and state cases referred to by the May
court, the federal case explicitly stated the general rule for retrial
and two exceptions and the state court construed the second
exception on a case to case basis. In applying the second
exception, which allows for the preclusion of a retrial in some
circumstances involving misconduct by a prosecutor, the
Appellate Division, Second Department has construed it to
require a showing of bad faith intent. 144
SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Gerstner 1
45
(decided February 2, 1996)
Defendant moved to dismiss felony charges arising out of
violations of Sections 1192(2)146 and 1192(3)147 of New York
143. Id.
144. See Copeland, 127 A.D.2d at 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949; See also
Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
145. 168 Misc. 2d 495, 638 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1996).
146. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1996). Section 1192
(2) provides:
Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while such person has .10 of one per cent or more by weight of
alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such
person's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions
of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
147. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
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State Vehicle and Traffic Law [hereinafter "VTL"]. 148
Defendant argued that the mandatory suspension of his driver's
license under Section 1193(2)(e)(7) of the VTL rose to the level
of a punishment that, coupled with felony charges, constituted
"successive prosecutions and potential multiple punishments for
the same crimes" 149 and therefore, subjected him to double
jeopardy in violation of the United States Constitution, 150 the
New York State Constitution 151 and New York Criminal
Procedure Law Article 40.152 The court, relying on a "myriad
of legal pronouncements" and a plain reading of the statute, held
that "suspension pending prosecution pursuant to VTL §
1193(2)(e)(7) [w]as not a separate proceeding, and ... since it
was the legislature's manifest intent that, in addition to a
suspension pending prosecution, one could be punished following
a conviction under VTL § 1192(2) or (3), the [d]efendant's
double jeopardy rights [were] not violated." 153
On February 25, 1995, the defendant, Gerard J. Gerstner, was
arrested for driving while intoxicated in violation of sections
1192(2) and 1192(3) of the VTL. 154 Thereafter, the defendant
was arraigned and his license suspended in accordance with the
provisions of § 1193(2)(e)(7) of the VTL. 155 These provisions of
148. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 496, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
149. Id.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"[n]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ...." Id.
151. N.Y. CONST. art. I sec. 6. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense..
."Id.
152. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 496, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560. See N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1) (McKinney 1986). Section 40.20(l) provides in
pertinent part: "A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense."
Id.
153. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 500-01, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63.
154. Id. at 496, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1192(2); .N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3).
155. Id. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAV § 1193(2)(e)(7) (McKinney 1996).
This section provides for the suspension of one's driver's license pending
prosecution for driving with an excessive blood alcohol content and states:
1997] 745
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the VTL, taken together, mandate the suspension of a defendant's
license upon arraignment while a subsequent prosecution is
pending where there is "reasonable cause to believe that, based
upon a chemical analysis, the defendant's blood alcohol content
was at least. 10 of one percent. "156
The court began its analysis by recognizing ,that protections
against double jeopardy include the prohibition of "a second trial
or prosecution for the same offense following either an acquittal
or a conviction, while additionally precluding multiple
punishments." 157 In order to determine whether, taken together,
defendant's driver's license suspension and prosecution of the
driving while intoxicated offenses violated double jeopardy, the
A court shall suspend a driver's license, pending prosecution, of any
person charged with a violation of subdivision two or three of section
eleven hundred ninety-two of this article who, at the time of arrest, is
alleged to have had. 10 of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in
such driver's blood as shown by chemical analysis of blood, breath,
urine or saliva, made pursuant to subdivision two or three of section
eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
156. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 496, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
157. Id. See also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1994) (holding
that the sentencing phase of a single prosecution for murder, after a jury
acquitted defendant of intentional murder, could not amount to a successive
prosecution in violation of double jeopardy and, therefore, the use, for
sentencing purposes, of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance was
not prohibited); Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 386-87 (1989) (finding that
where a state court fully vindicated a defendant's double jeopardy rights by
commuting the shorter of defendant's two consecutive sentences, one for
felony robbery and the other for felony murder, his subsequent confinement
pursuant to the longer, felony murder sentence, with credit for time already
served did not amount to double jeopardy); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969) (determining that neither the Double Jeopardy
provision nor the Equal Protection Clause bars imposition of "a more severe
sentence upon re-conviction" of a defendant who has had his original
conviction set aside at his own behest); People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 236,
480 N.E.2d 701, 710, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 121 (1985) (holding that "second
persistent felony hearing was constitutionally permissible . . . and
constitutional double jeopardy requirements did not bar a second felony
offender proceeding after a failure of proof in the second persistent felony
proceeding") (citations omitted).
3
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court needed to answer two basic questions. 158 First, whether
the suspension and prosecution constituted a single criminal
action so as not to subject defendant to successive prosecutions
and, second, whether the driver's license suspension under the
provisions of VTL § 1193(2)(e)(7) was remedial in nature. 15
9
In order to certify the first question in the affirmative, the court
reasoned that "the required proof for conviction under Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1192(2) [wa]s indistinguishable from that
which serve[d] as the basis for suspension of [Gerstner]'s driver's
license pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7)." 160
Therefore, the court, utilizing the double jeopardy analysis
applied in Grady v. Corbin1 61 and United States v. Dixon,162
158. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 497, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). In Grady, defendant was an operator of one of
three motor vehicles which was involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident. Id
at 511. At the time of the accident the defendant's blood alcohol level was
.19, nearly twice the legal limit. Id. While he was in the hospital receiving
treatment for his own injuries, defendant was served with two traffic
summonses which charged, driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor, and
failing to keep right of the median. Id. Both charges cited violations of the
applicable sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Id. Defendant pled guilty
to both charges in traffic court and a minimum sentence of a $350 fine with a
six-month license suspension was imposed by the presiding judge. Id. at 513.
However, at no time during the pendency of these proceedings was the court
informed, either by the defendant or the Assistant District Attorney, that the
accident involved a fatality. Id. at 512-13. Subsequently, a grand jury
indicted and charged defendant with "reckless manslaughter, second-degree
vehicular manslaughter, [] criminally negligent homicide... [,J third-degree
reckless assault . . .[,] and driving while intoxicated." Id. at 513. The
defendant sought to dismiss the indictment on grounds of "statutory and
constitutional double jeopardy." Id. at 514. The Supreme Court affirmed the
New York Court of Appeals ruling and barred all of the counts because each
"violate[d] the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment pursuant to
the Blockburger Test." Id. at 514. See Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The "Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent
prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Id. at 521.
Thus, under the Blockburger Test, "[i]f application of [the] test reveals that the
1997] 747
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found that "[s]ince identical statutory elements control[led] ...
the two provisions constitute[d] the 'same offense."' 163
However, the court's inquiry, for double jeopardy purposes, did
not end here but rather extended to the second more difficult
question: whether the driver's license suspension under the
provisions of VTL § 1193(2)(e)(7) was remedial in nature. 164
In analyzing the second question, the court recognized that the
"protection afforded by the constitutional Double Jeopardy
Clauses 'prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a
second time to punish criminally for the same offense."'
165
Although defendant argued that suspension of, one's driver's
license rose to the level of a punishment and therefore, the
subsequent criminal prosecution constituted a second punishment,
the court was not persuaded by this argument. 166 Instead the
offenses have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser included
offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease, and the subsequent
prosecution is barred." Id. at 516. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
162.509 U.S. 688 (1993) (finding, inter alia, that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precluded the prosecution of defendant because the individual elements of his
two crimes could not be abstracted from each other. The elements of the
"drug offense did not include any element[s] not contained in his previous
contempt offense . . . ."). Id. at 698-700.
163. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 497, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)). In Helvering,
a monetary penalty was imposed upon defendant for income tax evasion
despite defendant's acquittal on criminal charges. Id. at 398. The Supreme
Court determined that the monetary penalty, although severe, was remedial in
nature and therefore constituted a civil sanction. Id. at 400. Therefore, the
Court stated that "in the civil enforcement of a remedial sanction there can be
no double jeopardy." Id. at 404. See also People v. Daniels, 194 A.D.2d
420, 421, 598, N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that a defendant's
subsequent conviction of sodomy in the first degree was not barred on double
jeopardy grounds where the "antecedent proceedings under Article 10 of the
Family Court Act were civil in nature").
166. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 497, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 561. See e.g. State
v. Gustafson, 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996) (Ohio 1996) (finding an administrative
license suspension punishment in light of its deterrent purpose and retributive
intent); and People v. McRobbie, 168 Misc. 2d 151, 156, 636 N.Y.S.2d 975,
979 (Justice Ct. Monroe County. 1995) (determining that defendant's
suspension of his driver's license, which was closely related to criminal
[Vol 13
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court determined that under the principle of Barnes v. Tofany, 167
"the suspension or revocation of the privilege of operating a
motor vehicle is essentially civil in nature, having as its aims
chastening of the errant motorist, and more importantly, the
protection of the public from such a dangerous individual."1
68
However, the court recognized, utilizing the principles set forth
in United States v. Halper169 and its progeny, including
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,170 that
merely labeling a sanction civil in nature as opposed to criminal
was insufficient for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. 171
proceeding, did not serve solely as a remedial purpose, but rather served
purposes of deterrence and punishment).
167. 27 N.Y.2d 74, 261 N.E.2d 617, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1970). In
Barnes, the court of appeals upheld a subsequent mandatory sixty-day license
suspension after defendant's conviction of driving while ability impaired.
despite an initial discretionary sixty-day suspension. Id. at 77-78. 261 N.E.2d
619-20, 313 N.Y.S.2d 693-94. The court reasoned that the subsequent
suspension did not violate double jeopardy because it was based on the same
act. Id.
168. Id. at 78, 261 N.E.2d at 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 694. The court of
appeals held that the administrative proceeding which suspended defendant's
driving privilege was civil in nature. Id. at 77, 261 N:E.2d at 619. 313
N.Y.S.2d at 693. Therefore, the subsequent criminal prosecution did not
violate defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Id.
169. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, defendant was convicted of
submitting sixty-five fraudulent Medicare claims and was sentenced to prison
and fined $5,000. Id. at 437. However, subsequent to defendant's criminal
conviction, the government commenced a civil action against defendant,
seeking $130,000 pursuant to statute. Id. at 438. The Supreme Court
determined that since the $130,000 bore no rational relation to the governments
actual losses, which amounted to only $585, the sanction was punitive in
nature and not remedial and therefore constituted a second punishment in
violation of defendant's right against double jeopardy. Id. at 451-52.
170. 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (holding that a tax statutorily imposed had to be
characterized as punishment for double jeopardy analysis since it was exacted
after defendant was arrested and convicted of a crime which involved the same
conduct which gave rise to the tax). See Austin v. United States. 509 U.S.
602, 604 (1993) (applying Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to
in-rem civil forfeiture proceedings in order to limit the government's power to
punish).
171. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 497, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
1997] 749
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Furthermore, the court found that the language in Halper and
Kurth Ranch indicated that the double jeopardy rules stated
within these decisions "were not intended for general
application." 172 Moreover, the court found support within these
decisions for its conclusion that "such [civil] sanctions may
include deterrence as its purpose, while still not being
characterized as punishment, so long as the goal served by the
sanctions is not disproportionate when compared to their remedial
objectives." 173 Therefore, the Gerstner court concluded that
"although a license suspension pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1193(2(e)(7) may have a deterrent effect, its primary aim
and objective is the promotion of highway safety."1 74 Thus, the
remedial purpose behind the suspension of defendant's driving
privilege in Gerstner was "not overborne to the extent that it
should be categorized as punishment. "175
However, the Gerstner court did not end its double jeopardy
analysis at this juncture, but rather argued in the alternative and
determined that even if the suspension could be categorized as
punishment, it could still be permissible under a double jeopardy
analysis folowing the legal precedent set forth in Halper and
Kurth Ranch.176 The court found that such decisions "clearly
recognize that legislatures may authorize multiple punishments
for a single act within the same prosecution or proceeding."177
However, to afford protection under double jeopardy, the "total
punishment [must] not exceed that authorized by the
legislature."' 178 Therefore, the Gerstner court concluded that "if
172. Id.
173. Id. (citations omitted).




178. Id. (citing Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). The Johnson Court
stated that "[i]n contrast to the double jeopardy protection against multiple
trials, the final component of double jeopardy--protection against cumulative
punishments--is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is
confined to the limits established by the legislature." Id. at 499. The
Supreme Court reasoned that "the substantive power to prescribe crimes and
determine punishments is vested with the legislature, [therefore,] the question
750 [Vol 13
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the legislature so intends, double jeopardy does not bar
cumulative punishments in a single proceeding, such as a
combination of a prison term plus a fine, consecutive sentences,
or a prison term plus a forfeiture." 179
The Gerstner court recognized the difficulties that courts within
New York were having with respect to determining whether
suspension of one's driving privilege and subsequent criminal
prosecution occur within the same or separate proceedings. 180
Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, the Gerstner court,
relying on a "fundamental reading of [VTL § 1192 and §
1193(2)(e)(7)]" and determined that it was the legislature's intent
to provide for both the imposition of a criminal sanction
subsequent to a suspension pending this prosecution. 
181
Therefore, the Gerstner court found that the license suspension
was "imposed within the structure of a single criminal
prosecution" and thus, did not subject defendant to a multiple
punishment in violation of double jeopardy under either the
Federal or New York State Constitutions. 182
under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are 'multiple' [wias
essentially one of legislative intent."m Id. (citations omitted)).
179. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 500, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 562. (citing United
States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied. 115 S.Ct.
669 (1994)).
180. Id. See generally, People v. McLees, 166 Misc. 2d 260. 631
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1st Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1995) (citations omitted).
181. Id.
182. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d at 500, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
1997]
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